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Dancing to China’s Tune: Understanding 
the Impacts of a Rising China through the 
Political-Ecology Framework 
May Tan-Mullins 
China has become a great power and it is time for us to take cen-
tre stage in the world. (President Xi Jinping, 18 October 2017) 
President Xi Jinping announced the above at the 19th Communist 
Party Congress as an affirmation that China had “arrived” as a great 
power in the world. With a population of 1.3 billion, China became 
the world’s second-largest economy and contributed 39 per cent to 
world growth in 2016, according to the International Monetary Fund 
(World Economic Forum 2017a). China is the largest investor in 
renewable energy, having invested more than USD 100 billion in 
2015 (World Economic Forum 2017b). China also spearheaded the 
establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), a 
global financing institution with 57 member countries, including de-
veloped countries such as the United Kingdom and Germany. With 
China’s increasing economic and diplomatic presences in the world, 
coupled with its directive of “Going Out,” which was intensified by 
the recent Belt Road Initiative (BRI), China’s rise will inevitably im-
pact the world in terms of competition for resources, market share, 
and political influence. In particular, China’s insatiable appetite for 
natural resources to fuel its domestic growth and satisfy its energy 
needs has left an unparalleled and deepening footprint on the world’s 
environment (Liu and Diamond 2005; Mol 2011).  
In the first decade of the 2000s, shortages of domestic commod-
ities and global oil-price spikes have led China to increasingly turn to 
resource-rich regions such as Africa. In addition, some of China’s 
global investments are concentrated in sectors that are environmen-
tally sensitive, such as oil and gas exploration and global hydropower 
provision. Furthermore, the behaviours of these Chinese enterprises 
have fallen short of global expectations at times, especially in areas of 
social responsibility and environmental protection (Weng and Buck-
ley 2016). Moreover, some commentators and activists are concerned 
that China’s loans and engagement with some regions of the world 
appear to have no conditions attached and therefore undermine the 
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good work of Western donors around governance, human rights, and 
environmental protection (Naim 2007). However, more recent data 
shows a more varied picture with a range of winners and losers 
(Bräutigam 2011; Power, Mohan, and Tan-Mullins 2012; Tan-Mullins 
and Mohan 2013). Following a raft of measures from multilateral 
development banks and international financial institutions, along with 
growing pressure from international organisations, civil society organ-
isations, and local communities, China is now under pressure to 
demonstrate a commitment to take on the rising global responsibility 
that comes with being a great power and to enhance its performance 
in the areas of corporate social responsibility (CSR) and sustainable 
development in countries of investment (CAITEC, SASAC, and 
UNDP China 2017). 
However, the process of enhancing performance for sustainable 
investment is challenging, in particular for China, where an overseas 
investment decision is very much intertwined with political directives, 
due to its unique socialist market economy and because many of the 
“Going Out” companies are state-owned enterprises (SOE). Deci-
sions to build hydropower dams or undertake infrastructure projects 
are at times determined by broader political concerns and bilateral 
relations, instead of by pure rational economic and profit-oriented 
decision making. As such, the decisions to invest in a country/project 
and the associated outcomes are very much governed by political 
relations, which are usually unequal. In addition, these complex un-
equal power relations between states at an international level multiply 
and intensify when filtered down to the national and local levels, due 
to the increasing number of stakeholders involved in a project. The 
interests of these various stakeholder groups and the power relations 
between them further complicate the decision-making process in 
determining both how an environmental resource would be used in 
the local context and who the ultimate beneficiaries of these projects 
will be. Understanding this complex set of international actors, inter-
dependencies, and ecological impacts necessitates a broad theoretical 
framework (Urban, Mohan, and Cook 2013). 
This timely topical issue captures the complexity of transnational 
impacts of a rising China and the unequal power relations between 
various stakeholders at the international, national, and local levels. 
The differing outcomes in local contexts are assessed through four 
case studies of Chinese investment in the natural-resource and energy 
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sectors. By adopting the political ecology of a rising China frame-
work, we aim to disaggregate the transnational social, cultural, eco-
nomic, and environmental impacts of China as a great power. This 
introductory article will illustrate the background and usefulness of 
the political-ecology framework in the context of a rising China. It 
will be followed by a brief discussion on how the various articles in 
this issue contribute to this theoretical framework and enrich the 
empirical discussions. The rest of this topical issue will advance the 
discussion by utilising the political ecology of a rising China approach 
to evaluate the transnational impacts of a rising China through case 
studies in hydropower and mineral sectors in Asia and Africa. 
The Evolution of Political Ecology
The economy of nature and the ecology of man are inseparable 
and attempts to separate them are more than misleading, they are 
dangerous. Man’s destiny is tied to nature’s destiny and the arro-
gance of the engineering mind does not change this. (Bates 1960: 
247) 
As early as the 1960s, authors such as Bates highlighted the insepar-
able relationship between humans and their immediate physical envir-
onment, as voiced in the above quote from his book The Forest and the 
Sea, published in 1960. In order to fruitfully understand human–
environment interactions in large-scale projects, we need to pay equal 
attention to the human and environmental components with an em-
phasis on examining the interconnectedness of resources such as 
water, energy, and food security that these projects provide or re-
move from the relevant stakeholders. The complexity of these inter-
dependencies requires a new paradigm of approach and an interdis-
ciplinary understanding of both how decisions are being made and 
how those decisions impact the environment. A natural starting point 
would be the political-ecology approach, which “combines the con-
cerns of ecology with a broadly defined political economy” (Blaikie 
and Brookfield 1987: 17). The political ecology framework (Wolf 
1972; Greenberg and Park 1994) is an effective framework for analys-
ing the conflicts caused by the varied forms of control over access to 
natural resources such as water, energy, land, and forests (Bryant and 
Bailey 1997; Blaikie 1985; Peet and Watts 2004), as it highlights the 
governance issues and unequal distribution of costs and benefits as-
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sociated with environmental change brought on by human interven-
tion. “It is an integrated understanding of how environmental and 
political forces interact to mediate social and environmental change” 
(Bryant 1992: 12).  
As the phrase implies, political ecology simply looks at how pol-
itics determine the use of the environment – be they land, mineral, 
air, or water resources. Politics looks at the power relations between 
different actors and is at the heart of this framework (Tan-Mullins 
2007). By assessing the unequal power relations between actors, we 
can explain the uneven distribution of access to and control over 
environmental resources and the impacts of human actions on the 
ecology. “Power” here relates to the differential ability to control and/ 
or access the economic benefits of resource exploitation (Bryant 
1996, 1997; Peluso 1992; Dauvergne 1994). Bryant and Bailey (1997) 
developed three fundamental assumptions of the political-ecology 
framework applicable to developing countries: First, costs and bene-
fits associated with environmental change are distributed unequally. 
Second, this unequal distribution inevitably either reinforces or re-
duces existing social and economic inequalities. Third, the unequal 
distribution of costs and benefits and the reinforcing or reducing of 
pre-existing inequalities has political implications in terms of the al-
tered power relationships that result. The costs and benefits of such 
relations would also manifest in the environment, which forms part 
of the analysis in this framework.  
The field of Third World political ecology originated in the early 
1970s at a time when human–environment interactions were coming 
under increasing public and scholarly scrutiny (Bryant and Bailey 
1997: 1). It was employed as a way to think about how questions of 
access to and control over resources are indispensable for under-
standing both the geography of environmental degradation and the 
prospects for green and sustainable alternatives (Watts 2000: 259). 
Simplistic claims about population growth and environmental degra-
dation in the Third World, central to neo-Malthusian beliefs (which 
see the growing population as the main cause of environmental deg-
radation), came under fire as they failed to understand the political 
and social aspects of human–environment interactions. In the late 
1980s, two geographical monographs that provided the theoretical 
foundation for the formalisation of political ecology were written by 
Piers Blaikie (1985), The Political Economy of Soil Erosion in Developing 
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Countries, and Piers Blaikie and Harold Brookfield (1987), Land Deg-
radation and Society. These works expanded the political-ecology ap-
proach through a demonstration of a more complex understanding of 
how power relations mediate human–environment interactions by 
including the social and economic aspects of environmental changes. 
Dominant political-ecology scholars, such as Peluso (1992) and 
Peet and Watts (1996), have shed light on the “micro-politics,” en-
lightening readers on environmental conflicts and cooperation at the 
local level but providing less information about the wider theoretical 
and comparative significance of actors involved in local interactions 
(Bryant 1998: 93). In the late 1980s and early 1990s, “globalisation” 
became a dominant theme, and it became necessary to link findings 
on one scale (local) to those on another (provincial, national, and 
global) in order to facilitate a comprehensive understanding of trans-
national power relations in a particular context. Hence by the late 
1990s and early 2000s, a number of edited books combined papers 
focusing on different scales (Peet and Watts 1996, 2004; Dearden 
2002; Peluso and Watts 2001; Hirsch and Warren 1998; King 1998; 
Howitt, Connell and Hirsch 1996; Parnwell and Bryant 1996). The 
above-stated research provided a more complete view of the interre-
lated local and global factors in determining human–environment 
interactions. 
What Exactly Is Political Ecology?  
All ecological projects (and arguments) are simultaneously political 
economic projects (and arguments) and vice-versa. Ecological ar-
guments are never socially neutral any more than socio-political 
arguments are ecologically neutral. Looking more closely at the 
way ecology and politics interrelate then becomes imperative if we 
are to get a better handle on how to approach environmental/ 
ecological questions. (Harvey 1993: 25) 
As Harvey (1993) states, “Politics is important when approaching 
environmental or ecological questions.” Indeed, in the political-ecol-
ogy framework, politics is central to the examination of human–en-
vironment interactions. The workings of a politicised environment 
are appreciated in the complex manner in which actors interrelate at 
the material and discursive level over environmental questions (Bry-
ant and Bailey 1997: 47). Politics are also influential in the strategies 
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used to present different environmental explanations as legitimate 
bases for policy (Forsyth 2003: 266). Political ecologists, besides look-
ing at politics, also focus on the economic, social, and cultural aspects 
of life and the global systems of production.  
Many scholars have attempted to conceptualise power either by 
methods of control (Bryant 1992, 1997, 1998) or through access to 
the tools of power (such as knowledge and technology). However, 
such conceptualisations of power cannot be fully understood without 
understanding the interests of the different actors. The following 
paragraphs will discuss the four methods of controlling resources as 
conceptualised by Bryant (1997) – (i) the power to pollute, (ii) the 
control of social prioritisation of environmental projects, (iii) the 
indirect discursive control through ideas, and (iv) the control over 
access to resources (Harvey 1993) – in addition to considering the 
interests of various stakeholder groups. 
The first method of control relates to the power to decide the 
location of polluting industries and the impacts of such industries on 
a community. Examining pollution in the Indonesian context, 
McDowell (1989) and Lucas (1998) illustrated how these industries 
are able to manifest their power over the environment. On a global 
scale, the movement of selected “dirty” industries from the First to the 
Third World also illustrates the power of the First World to pollute 
developing countries. However, in today’s context of rising powers, we 
have countries such as China that are neither developed nor First 
World but in a superior economic position to relocate certain pollut-
ing industries to other countries (Roberts 2014). Social prioritisation 
of environmental projects is another method by which an actor can 
control access to environmental resources. This form of control is 
usually carried out for the personal benefits of relevant actors and to 
favour the allocation of financial and human resources to those envir-
onmental projects of most interest to said actors (see Hurst 1990; 
Rush 1991; Dauvergne 1994). For example, in communist China 
during Mao Zedong’s era, his perception of the environment was 
very much in line with communist ideology, which perceives nature 
as a production tool for human beings, and as something to be fully 
exploited and conquered for human use and production purposes. As 
such, Chairman Mao prioritised large industrialisation projects from 
1949 to 1976 and looked to technology to reconfigure nature for the 
use of man. As such, during his time “mountains were to be moved, 
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forests cut, dams built, lakes filled up, rivers diverted, wastelands 
planted, and errant species eliminated” (Branigan 2012). 
The third method of control, indirect discursive control of ideas 
or values, relates to how actors may exert their power. As Schmink 
and Wood (1987: 51) noted, ideas are never neutral but either rein-
force or challenge existing social and economic arrangements. For 
example, the communist philosophy of using technology to over-
come nature has resulted in some of the most environmentally de-
structive campaigns in China, such as the Four Pests Campaign, a 
project with good intent but catastrophic consequences for the envir-
onment. This method of control illustrates the power of an actor to 
define a problem, which leads to the question: Who has the power to 
frame and define the problem? In most cases, it is the state leader-
ship, as it manages both technology, such as in the media, and politi-
cal ideologies, allowing continuous assertions of these discursive val-
ues to become the mainstream discourses. Another example is For-
syth (2003) urging us to question the meta-narratives of what is 
meant by “ecology.” Many social theorists discuss notions of ecology 
as forms of unproblematised truth, but these notions need to be ana-
lysed in order to reveal their hidden politics and applicability to dif-
ferent environmental problems in various contexts (Forsyth 2003: 
278). With the Internet being far-reaching and highly accessible to 
most people, it provides other actors with a much-needed platform 
for alternative definitions of “ecology.” 
The primary aim of the last method of control, the control of ac-
cess to resources, is to monopolise a valued environmental resource, 
thus controlling the ensuing economic benefits that may be derived 
from its exploitation (Bryant 1997: 11). Works by Bryant (1992, 
1996), Peluso (1992, 1995), Dauvergne (1994), and MacAndrews 
(1994) illustrate this method of control. As this method results in 
tight economic and political control of a dominant resource sector by 
the ruling elite, it leaves little scope for accumulating wealth and sta-
tus outside of state patronage (Le Billion 2001: 567). Tan-Mullins and 
Mohan (2012) illustrated how oil development is concentrated in the 
hands of Angolan elites, which perpetuated an enclavic space of de-
velopment. Another example is from China, where in recent years the 
media has run headlines on how private enterprises have engaged in 
land grabbing from local communities in the name of national devel-
opment projects. According to a survey by Landesa (2011), almost 
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half of Chinese villages have lost some or all of their land since the 
late 1990s. The survey found that in nearly a quarter of those cases, 
the villagers were not compensated. 
The conceptualisation of power can also be examined through 
access to the tools of power. The accumulation of power by different 
actors today comes mostly through the possession of knowledge and 
technology. For example, the Chinese state, through the appropria-
tion of mass media and telecommunication systems, has been able to 
control the discursive means of knowledge and ideas. The state also 
uses satellite images to track and to control the access of other actors 
to the environment. Different resources, such as knowledge and 
technology, as well as access to information, empower different ac-
tors to varying degrees to effect change on the environment. Mean-
while, NGOs, by gaining access to the media, are also able to express 
their environmental agendas and interests to the public via Chinese 
social media outlets such as WeChat. Yet, it is important to note that 
most media operates within the jurisdiction and censorship regula-
tions of the state. The less powerful actors such as NGOs or local 
leaders may use the same technology as the state, such as social me-
dia, to pursue their own economic and political agendas, notably to 
mount campaigns attacking the practices of powerful actors (Bryant 
1997: 13). However, it is difficult to conclude that access to the media 
is a viable avenue of voicing discontent – due not only to China’s 
infamous “Great Firewall of China” but also to reports being at times 
biased or slanted towards the government’s stance because of fear of 
being shut down or politically persecuted, measures not uncommonly 
undertaken in the Chinese Internet and social media sphere.  
The physical environment, at times, may serve as an indicator of 
the amount of power an actor wields. For example, by looking at a 
physical landscape that was transformed by human–environment 
interactions, the scale of change inscribed onto the environment illus-
trates the power of the actors. Patterns of control involving powerful 
actors may be illustrated by the impact of large-scale economic activi-
ties on the landscape such as logging, mining, or cash cropping (Bry-
ant 1998: 83). Specific nodes of control and resistance, such as large 
hydroelectric dams or industrial plants, can also be used to highlight 
unequal power relations. Likewise, the less powerful actors may exert 
their “acts of resistance” towards the more powerful actors through 
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illegal activities such as illegal logging or small-scale agricultural pro-
duction.  
As indicated earlier, power relations is at the heart of this frame-
work. In order to understand the interplay of power between the 
various actors and understand why they act the way they do, we need 
to delve into the personal interests and agendas of these actors. 
Looking at how different actors manage the control and access to 
resources will give us insights into the mechanisms of resource access 
behind the scenes. It will also help us to understand the contention or 
cooperation for resource allocation as an outcome of different actors 
pursuing distinct aims and interests (Long and Long 1992). There is 
thus a need to assume that politics is about the interaction of actors 
over environmental resources, and that even weak actors possess 
some power to act in pursuit of their interests. Bryant and Bailey 
(1997) have broadly categorised “given” groups of actors as (i) the 
state, (ii) multilateral institutions, (iii) business, (iv) environmental 
non-governmental organisations, and (v) grassroots actors.  
The state derives its power mainly through the legislative process 
to act in the “national” interest. It tends to play a pivotal role in ef-
forts to resolve problems at the local, regional, and global levels, re-
flecting its “stewardship” role in society. Yet the primary goal of the 
world’s states since World War II has been to assert political control 
over the people living in the territory under their jurisdiction, often 
amidst widespread social unrest. In China, a way to legitimise the 
power of those in control of a given state has been to pursue eco-
nomic development for the nation, even if it is at the expense of the 
environment, through intense extraction of natural resources for 
export. At the international level, states find cooperation with each 
other imperative to their attempts to take a global approach to deal-
ing with environmental problems. Yet, little remedial action is taken, 
as states jealously guard their sovereignty. The 1997/98 forest fires 
ignited by slash-and-burn practices in Indonesia are a clear illustration 
of this – as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
adopted a non-interference policy towards activities in the sovereign 
space of its member states, these member states could do nothing 
about the transboundary air pollution except propose preventive 
methods for the future, which were adopted later by the association.  
There are two categories of multilateral institutions: technical in-
stitutions (e.g. the Food and Agriculture Organisation – FAO, or the 
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United Nations’ various technical programmes) and international 
financial institutions (e.g. the International Monetary Fund – IMF, or 
the World Bank – WB). Political ecologists frequently do not view 
these international organisations as the solution for the environmen-
tal degradation in Third World countries, but rather as part of the 
problem. This is because these technical organisations often pursue 
policies through the lens of capitalist development led by states of the 
global North (especially the United States), and are also guided by 
their desire to impose on states of the global South “modernised” 
Western knowledge in aid of “development.” The outcome of pol-
icies is the intensification and extension of environmental degradation 
in the global South, as the emphasis is continually centred on the 
need to introduce modernised technologies to intensify the extraction 
process. International financial institutions such as the IMF and the 
WB accumulate their power mainly through the ability to regulate 
financial resources in terms of loans or aid to Third World countries. 
Loans for industrial and development projects obtained from the WB 
often received criticism for their insensitivity towards how these pro-
jects affect local communities socially and economically. However, as 
a result of these criticisms, the AIIB and New Development Bank 
(NDB), led by China and BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) 
countries, were recently established with more focus on the agenda 
and needs of developing and Third World countries.  
At the same time, the above international institutions play an ex-
tremely important role in the globalised international economy. As 
“international governors,” these organisations perform the role of 
“troubleshooters” in times of crisis. It is through such “regional” 
organisations that states are finding new political, economic, and 
social realisation in a globalising world. Yet, for many states in the 
developing world, there is still tension caused by letting go of some 
aspects of national sovereignty to embrace the globalising processes. 
Given the stark economic and power disparities of the developed and 
developing worlds, it is not hard to see why poor, powerless, devel-
oping countries are resisting the globalising processes. The anti-glo-
balisation stance of the current president of the United States, Don-
ald Trump, also demonstrates that negative impacts of globalisation 
are not affecting the developing world exclusively. However, it is also 
through participation in global governance and processes that global 
leaders, bureaucrats, and entrepreneurs are engaged in the interactive 
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acquisition of knowledge and co-create solutions to resolve global 
challenges.  
Businesses, according to Bryant and Bailey (1997: 103), are di-
vided into transnational companies (TNC) and local businesses. The 
growing power and influence of business today is linked to the devel-
opment of a global capitalist system; both TNCs and local businesses 
have played a central role in the development of a politicised envir-
onment in the Third World. First World TNCs often ignore envir-
onmental regulations, due to their own footloose nature and the de-
sire of states to solicit these TNCs with lax environmental regula-
tions. But these TNCs are gradually realising the need to develop 
“green” corporate strategies and a green image in their practices 
worldwide. In China, there are further complexities, as the biggest 
TNCs are often SOEs. This means the profit-driven nature of private 
TNCs is muddled by state and political agendas and interests. These 
companies are also gradually realising the need to develop policies 
that will help them sustain their investment in the host countries 
through a sustainable development approach that emphasises green 
growth.  
Another group of stakeholders are non-governmental organisa-
tions (NGOs), which play significant roles in championing local 
communities in Third World countries. The growth of civil society 
since the 1970s has seen a proliferation of environmental NGOs, 
known as ENGOs, concerned with environmental security and basic 
livelihood issues. This proliferation was fuelled by the belief in the 
declining capacity of the state to provide social, environmental, and 
livelihood security for its citizens. There are two broad types of ENGOs: 
First World ENGOs and Third World ENGOs. The main method 
by which these ENGOs accumulate power is through the possession 
and championing of a strong “moral” cause for people, as they are 
perceived as the defenders of values that governments and corpora-
tions are all too willing to compromise (Princen 1994: 34-35). The 
methods by which they exert political influence are lobbying to influ-
ence environmental policies and practices of the state, businesses, and 
multilateral organisations; supporting conservation and development 
projects proposed and operated by grassroots actors; campaigning 
through the media; and organising activities at international develop-
ment and environmental conferences. At times, these First World and 
Third World ENGOs work together on local projects, usually with 
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the former providing financial and technical resources while the latter 
facilitates the local implementation of knowledge. The ability of these 
ENGOs to operate depends highly on the democratic stage of the 
state in which they operate, and on whether the state will allow them 
to campaign for their chosen cause, which may be (in fact, often is) 
against the state’s agenda. In China, NGOs are highly constrained by 
Chinese regulations and have very little space to manoeuvre in terms 
of canvassing for policy change. However, international NGOs such 
as the International River Network (IRN) have better track records in 
terms of socialising Chinese government institutions and Chinese 
enterprises to enhance their CSR performance.  
Last, and most importantly, come the grassroots actors, who are 
often considered to be on the losing end of these environmental 
struggles. This is because many of these struggles involve more im-
mediate impacts on their own environmental and livelihood secur-
ities. The development of local institutions beyond the grassroots 
actors to regulate the latter’s use of and access to resources creates a 
scenario in which those grassroots actors are kept from resources on 
which they depend for their livelihoods. For example, indigenous 
knowledge of grassroots actors regarding the resources in the area are 
disregarded as “unscientific” or “primitive,” which leads to them 
being excluded from the decision-making process. Yet, this exclusion 
often results in an appalling gap between policy formulation and the 
practicality of these policies at the local level. To counteract these 
unequal relationships between grassroots organisations and the state 
and businesses, local actors often express their discontent through 
individual acts of everyday resistance, ranging from protests over land 
grabbing (Branigan 2012) to small acts of vandalism. These acts 
might seem insignificant, but when multiplied a thousand-fold, they 
may in the end make utter shambles of the policies suggested by their 
“superiors” in the capital (Scott 1985). These grassroots groups usual-
ly organise themselves into either protest or self-help groups, with the 
former being more visible, as they accumulate their power through 
protests that occur in the limelight.  
Finally, political ecologists focus on the politics within a certain 
geographic space (such as a village), juxtaposing that space with coun-
terparts on the national and international level, to examine the dyna-
mism of politics between different actors and assess how these polit-
ical interactions affect the outcome of resource-access problems and 
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management at the local level. The intersection of processes across 
scales rather than the singular dominance of one scale (e.g. global 
networks versus states or the local communities) are crucial for ex-
plaining how decisions are made. Thus, one of the challenges facing 
political ecologists is to break out of these pre-given, scalar containers 
(i.e. local, regional, national, and global) in order to examine human–
environmental dynamics that occur in other socially produced and 
ecological scales. The equation is no longer simple, as the interplay 
between actors is cross-scale and inter-group. The relationships be-
tween these actors can no longer be easily classified into binary or 
triangular models; rather, there is a dynamic fluid interaction between 
different actor groups from various scales and different actors within 
these groups at the local level. This issue of scale is also of particular 
importance because the interconnectedness of the natural geography 
of the ocean illustrates the difficulties in clearly defining the bounda-
ries of such an environment. As Robbins rightly pointed out,  
the ascent in scales imposes a “chain of command” where players 
at distantly removed scales (peasants, states, the World Trade Or-
ganization) have little interaction. (Robbins 2004: 211) 
Zimmerer and Bassett (2003: 288) also similarly indicated that more 
attention should be given to the spatiality of social life, especially the 
politics of scale, and to integrating ecological scales into analytical 
frameworks.  
Political Ecology and a Rising China 
The political-ecology framework, in general, is an appropriate frame-
work to assess human–environment interactions, human decisions, 
and humans’ impacts on the environment. However, we need to as-
sess what drives and empowers the Chinese stakeholders engaged in 
large environmental projects globally in order to further refine the 
theoretical concept of the political ecology of rising China. Under-
standing a complex set of international actors, interdependencies, and 
ecological impacts through this framework allows us to investigate 
the fluid power relations between national and transnational actors, 
and between politics and ecology. This will better enable us to com-
prehend the environmental consequences of transnational invest-
ment. However, there is a need to focus on the specificity of a rising 
China and how its role as a rising power affects and influences the 
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power relations between Chinese actors and others by examining 
“where the power lies” among the various actors involved and “what 
empowers” these actors. Furthermore, we need to understand the 
broader Chinese discourse and rhetoric in the engagement between 
China and the rest of the world. In many instances, Chinese projects 
tend to be embedded within the broader Chinese rhetoric of South–
South cooperation, non-interference, and being mutually beneficial, 
whereby the importance of political alliances and solidarity in today’s 
world is emphasised. Deconstructing broader Chinese discourse and 
rhetoric will further our understanding of the interests of these Chi-
nese stakeholders.  
The majority of earlier work on China’s engagement with low- 
and middle-income countries (LMIC) has been speculative (Mohan 
2008), economistic (Jacques 2009), and Africa-focused (Alden, Large, 
and Soares de Oliveira 2008; Bräutigam 2009). Crucially, these studies 
have largely ignored the environmental consequences of China’s in-
ternationalisation. In our past works, we infused the political-ecology 
framework with works on the so-called “Asian drivers” to explain the 
rise of China and its global, national, and local impacts (Urban et al. 
2013; Urban et al. 2015). The Asian drivers framework developed by 
Humphrey and Messner, Schmitz, and Kaplinsky and Messner as-
sesses China’s direct and indirect impacts as a rising power and its 
channels of interaction with low- and middle-income countries. In 
each of these channels – aid, trade, investment, global governance, 
individuals/migrants, and environment – there will be a mixture of 
complementary and competitive economic impacts, plus positive and 
negative impacts in relation to society and the environment (Kaplin-
sky and Messner 2008). We (Urban et al. 2011; Urban et al. 2013; 
Urban, Mohan, and Cook 2013) discuss these impacts by addressing 
the relevant motives, actors, and beneficiaries, in addition to analysing 
how, why, and to what effect Chinese actors engage in low- and mid-
dle-income countries (see Table 1).  
Large-scale dam development provokes strong emotions because 
of the uneven distribution of costs and benefits, which in turn focus-
es attention on the political environment and the actors involved 
(Bryant and Bailey 1997). This “political ecology of the Asian drivers” 
framework has enabled scholars such as our team to address how 
Chinese investment strategies in large hydropower dams are managed 
vis-à-vis LMICs; their impacts on local social and environmental 
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conditions in recipient countries; the effects on local and regional 
governance; and the implications for global hydropower development 
(Tan-Mullins, Urban, and Mang 2017; Olorunfemi et al. 2017; Sicili-
ano et al. 2016). This framework is highly flexible and proves useful 
to investigate actors’ interests and how they determine the behaviour 
of actors operating at a variety of scales influencing local interaction 
with environmental resources. A key advantage of this approach is 
that it allows for a more complex understanding of the interactions 
between these actors. However, this approach tends to treat the ac-
tors (such as businesses) as monolithic entities (Bury 2008), which is 
not appropriate in the case of China, and this has become problemat-
ic in assessing the power relations that host state agencies have vis-à-
vis transnational businesses. The classification of actors into pre-
scribed groups or “containers” is inadequate for a comprehensive 
understanding of how power shifts and changes, especially when 
many big transnational Chinese companies are not privatised, but 
state-owned. This muddles Chinese companies’ interests as a stake-
holder group, as decisions are at times infused with political direc-
tives.  
Table 1. Political Ecology of the Asian Drivers Framework 
Channel Motives Actors Beneficiaries Impacts 
    Positive Negative 
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Trade        
Investment 
(FDI)  
      
Aid        
Innovation        
Politics        
Source: Urban, Mohan, and Cook 2013. 
The political ecology of a rising China framework also argues the 
need to focus on the specificity of rising China and how its role as a 
rising power affects and influences its power relations between Chi-
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nese actors and others. The framework hence fills this gap by decon-
structing the Chinese hydropower sector by examining “where the 
power lies” among the various actors involved and “what empowers” 
these actors. In China, knowledge and technology are not the only 
factors that determine access to resources; access to capital; factors of 
production such as labour, land, or boats; markets for the finished 
products; and political and social capital (see Anderson 1990; Robert-
son 1996) may also influence the ease, profits, and efficiency of ac-
cess. According to Le Billion (2001: 567), access to the commodity 
value chain is often closely linked to social identities, articulated in 
particular entitlements and horizontal inequalities along lines of eth-
nicity, class, or religion within the political economy of a resource. 
Thus, it is important to note that, other than knowledge and technol-
ogy, access to capital, factors of production, markets, social identities, 
and informal political power are also important determinants in the 
process of environmental access. In particular, China’s cultural values 
of guanxi and personal relations play a huge role in determining access 
to and control of resources.  
To illustrate the above using the China hydropower sector as an 
example, many of the Chinese hydropower companies identified are 
SOEs, and although profit margins are one of the main concerns of 
transnational companies, business decisions are sometimes made 
regardless of whether there will be positive returns. Similarly, some 
profitable dam proposals are halted for political reasons. This is be-
cause some of the projects are politically influenced, initiated, and 
guaranteed by the Chinese government and at times aided with pref-
erential loans. We also found that there is a high level of competition 
between these Chinese dam builders, and that they act very different-
ly (Tan-Mullins, Urban, and Mang 2017). The main players are Sino-
hydro (also known as PowerChina), PowerChina Resources Limited 
(an international subsidiary of Sinohydro), China Huaneng Group 
(owner of China Huaneng Lancang River Hydropower Group), Chi-
na Huadian Corporation, Datang International Power Generation 
Company, China Three Gorges Corporation, China Water Interna-
tional and Electric Corporation (CWE) (subsidiary of China Three 
Gorges Group), China Southern Power Grid (CSG), China 
Gezhouba Group Company Limited, China Civil Engineering Con-
struction Corporation (CCECC), China National Electric Engineer-
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ing Company (CNEEC), State Power Investment Corporation (CPI), 
and China National Heavy Machinery Corporation (CHMC).  
It was possible in the past to carry out projects with minimal 
profits, as national policy guidelines overrode profit concerns. How-
ever, in recent years, the number of overseas projects has become a 
prominent assessment criterion for leadership performance, adding a 
sense of urgency to initiate and complete projects, driven by senior 
executives seeking to maintain their status amid government SOEs’ 
restructuring initiatives (Tan-Mullins, Urban, and Mang 2017). This 
means companies have begun to look for ways to improve their profit 
margins and increase revenues by investing in the global market and 
cutting costs. Sector reforms in 2003 that involved “privatising” five 
of China’s largest power companies also means companies are now in 
a better position to capitalise on their competitive advantage, func-
tion independently from central-government directives, and focus on 
profit making (McDonald, Bosshard, and Brewer 2009). The above 
reforms, coupled with the decreasing number of suitable sites for new 
mega-dams in China, have led these companies to realise the need to 
explore external markets. As such, many of these companies, with 
little or no international market experience, were compelled to ex-
plore new regions in the global hydropower industry, such as Africa 
and Latin America. This also means they are then “confronted with 
challenges and responsibilities unfamiliar to them in China” (Interna-
tional Rivers 2012: 6).  
The existence of numerous stakeholders in a single sector 
demonstrates the further complicity of categorising actors within a 
stakeholder group; within this, there will be situations in which one 
actor acts very differently from the others as a result of varying pri-
vate interests. Li’s (2001) emphasis on agency and concepts of articu-
lation and positioning in terms of how indigenous people identified 
themselves are similar in this context in terms of practice. Li argued 
that self-identification of indigenous people draws upon historically 
sedimented practices, landscapes, and repertoires of meaning, and 
that this emerges through particular patterns of engagement and 
struggle, realigning the ways indigenous people connect to the nation 
and the government. Indeed, categorising and grouping various ac-
tors into predetermined groups is a problematic approach in reality, 
as human agency and positioning present varying agendas and inter-
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ests in different contexts and when interacting with different stake-
holder groups.  
To summarise, the political ecology of the Asian drivers frame-
work is a good starting point for assessing the global impacts of a 
rising China. However, we need to situate the analysis and contextual-
ise it within the social, cultural, and economic realms of Chinese soci-
ety. By integrating the Chinese socio-political structures and the evo-
lution and composites of the “Going Out” actors, and by under-
standing the power structure and relations between the Chinese ac-
tors, we are better able to examine and explain the actual effects of a 
rising China in a holistic and comprehensive manner. By doing so, we 
will also be able to develop strategies to engage and socialise the nu-
merous Chinese actors into best practices of global governance and 
investment behaviour.  
The Significance of This Topical Issue 
This topical issue represents the culmination of two years’ commit-
ment and hard work. The team first met at the Development Studies 
Association’s annual conference in September 2016 in Oxford at a 
roundtable discussing the impacts of a rising China through the lens 
of a political-ecology framework. In this conference, we came to the 
conclusion that a comprehensive framework to help us understand 
the environmental impacts of a rising China was lacking, particularly 
in an overseas context. We acknowledged the complex socio-political 
and economic realities of China, and how it is constantly evolving 
due to its domestic directives and foreign policies. We also agreed 
that China is rising, with huge potential to be a superpower in the 
future, and that working with China in realms of global governance 
would therefore be of great importance. In particular, we see the 
potential of China to become the leader of global green development, 
not just in the field of renewable-energy investment, but more cru-
cially, in areas of CSR, embedding green ideology into its “Going 
Out” actors and translating it into daily practices of sustainable and 
green investment through Chinese companies. This prompted us to 
come together to further explore the idea of expanding the political-
ecology framework and infusing it with Chinese characteristics.  
There are four contributions in this topical issue, two looking at 
Chinese hydropower projects in Asia, one examining a Chinese water 
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conservation project in Nigeria, and the last delving into the Chinese 
investment into Namibia’s uranium sector. We made a conscientious 
effort to ensure and celebrate the diversity of the contributors for this 
topical issue, with authors coming from different regions and back-
grounds. By adopting a case-study approach, this topical issue capital-
ises on four different examples to enrich the empirical dataset, tease 
out the common themes, and compare and contrast issues and chal-
lenges that different stakeholders encounter in the course of experi-
encing a rising China. This topical issue further hones the political 
ecology of a rising China framework by contextualising the political-
ecology framework within each individual case study and serves as an 
analytical tool to unpack the impacts of a rising China in specific 
projects. In addition, Adeniran, DeBoom, Hensengerth, and Fam 
explore the roles that Chinese socio-political structures play in ex-
plaining the social, cultural, economic, experiential, and environmen-
tal impacts at the local level.  
Adeniran, in his article focusing on the Sino–Nigerian water con-
servation project and examining technology transfer between Gansu 
and Kano cities, presents a positive case of a rising China. Adeniran 
looks at the Chinese Gansu-modelled agricultural/irrigation project in 
Kano and focuses on sharing best practices in agriculture by inferring 
from successes of a similar anti-desertification project already execut-
ed in Gansu, Northwest China. With funding from the Chinese gov-
ernment, this project replicated the successful use of water tanks to 
collect rainwater and managed to improve irrigation systems by train-
ing small-scale farmers in Nigeria on water conservation, anti-desert-
ification strategies, ecological restoration, and forestation techniques. 
These methods in turn increased the food security of the surrounding 
communities and reduced the poverty level in these villages.  
Adeniran goes beyond the immediate impacts of this Chinese 
project in Nigeria to look at the longer-term and trickle-down im-
pacts of Chinese involvement on the African continent, especially in 
poverty alleviation and development issues. In this study, he found 
that capacity building in developing and transitioning countries is a 
key prerequisite for improving agricultural production, local liveli-
hoods, and environmental quality. This can be achieved by empower-
ing rural dwellers. This article also explores the possibility of upscal-
ing a project that has been successful in one micro-location to other 
regions in the country.  
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What is interesting in this case study is that despite the positive 
outcomes in terms of water conservation and better farming tech-
niques that increase food yield and food security, land degradation 
was evident due to increasing pressures on the land by the successful 
growth of crops, which increases the area of land converted to farm-
land. This exemplifies the complex interdependence of ecological 
systems and how a decision that might be deemed as a sustainable 
solution for one project will inevitably impact other parts of the eco-
system with differentiating outcomes. The question we will have to 
then ask is, “Does the environment always have to be the loser in the 
course of development?” 
In DeBoom’s article, she looks at Chinese investment into Na-
mibia’s uranium sector. The uranium sector presents additional chal-
lenges to both the Chinese and Namibian governments, due to the 
highly radioactive nature of the mineral. By disaggregating the differ-
ent actors in the Husab uranium mine project through various phases 
of development, she successfully untangles the complex power rela-
tions between the Chinese and Namibian actors. Clearly an unequal 
partnership at first glance, with the Chinese government owning 90 
per cent of the mine while the Namibian partners have 10 per cent, 
DeBoom investigates the indirect, longer-term impacts of enhanced 
political legitimacy for both governments, along with other positive 
social impacts such as higher living standards through better provi-
sion of health services. However, at the same time, she also notes that 
these positive benefits are unequally distributed among the different 
stakeholders.  
DeBoom goes beyond the political-ecology framework, integrat-
ing it with science and technology studies and postcolonial studies 
within the overarching theme of “hybridity” to assess Chinese in-
volvement in the extractive sector in Namibia. By doing so, she man-
ages to unpack the rhetoric – for example, phrases such as “South–
South solidarity” – surrounding this unequal relationship between the 
owners of the mines and delve into the actual direct and indirect im-
mediate, mid-, and long-term impacts of Chinese engagement with 
the Namibian stakeholders. She correctly concludes by highlighting 
that it is ultimately the unequal distribution of benefits among the 
stakeholders that will deepen rather than reduce inequality.  
The next two articles focus on Chinese hydropower projects in 
the Asian region, a topic close to my own heart and also one fraught 
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with huge complexity, due to the water, food, and energy nexus. Hydro-
power dams are back in the spotlight owing to a shifting preference 
for low-carbon energy generation and their possible contribution to 
mitigating climate change. At the forefront of the renaissance of large 
hydropower dams are Chinese companies, the builders of the world’s 
largest dams at home and abroad, which are opening up opportuni-
ties for low- and middle-income countries. However, large hydro-
power dams, despite their possible developmental and carbon-reduc-
tive contributions, are accompanied by huge economic costs, pro-
found negative environmental changes, and grave social impacts. 
Many factors contribute to the “successful” building and long-term 
management of a mega-hydropower project, ranging from rigorous 
environmental impact assessments (EIA), best-practice engineering, 
fair resettlement procedures, and just compensation, to thorough 
environmental mitigation strategies such as grievance and complaint 
mechanisms, CSR and, more recently, attention to social and local 
cultural practices. 
In Hensengerth’s paper, he situates the political-ecology frame-
work of rising China in the realm of regional identity, social cohesion, 
and relations between different actors within communities. He argues 
that the actors driving the development in the Greater Mekong Sub-
region (GMS) have exacerbated social tensions through hydropower 
programmes that have weakened the social coherence of communi-
ties. In this paper, he explores the intimate relationship between water, 
culture, and identity and how that contributes to the regional identity 
of the communities through the lens of the political-ecology ap-
proach, by examining concepts of waterscapes and how one’s identity 
is intertwined with the environment that one resides in. By looking 
into the various controls and uses of water resources in the GMS, 
Hensengerth demonstrates how Chinese involvement in the region, 
through building hydropower dams, exacerbates the unequal power 
relations and increases tensions and conflicts between different ac-
tors. He also describes how China ensures both its own control over 
the water resources and its own benefits from them, and illustrates 
how China is altering the community identities in the region.  
Using the Lower Sesan 2 project as an example, Hensengerth not 
only describes the complex trade-offs between food security, fish 
biodiversity, local livelihood protection, and hydropower generation 
but, more importantly, elucidates how this nexus threatens the tradi-
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tional way of life, identity making, and ultimately the regional cohe-
siveness of communities residing within the GMS. By virtue of their 
active engagement in the build-up of hydropower across Mekong 
countries, Chinese companies are key participants in this conflict. 
One of the biggest challenges Hensengerth presents in his paper is 
that these cultural issues have not been included in compensation 
policies, which typically incorporate assets that can be expressed in 
economic value, and that this challenge is not unique to the GMS but 
is, in fact, a global problem. How can the loss of cultural values, spir-
itual attachment and, ultimately, a person’s/community’s identity be 
compensated for? 
Last, Fam’s article uses the political-ecology approach to unpack 
the experiences of governments and displaced communities in Sara-
wak, Malaysia, in a case study of a Chinese-built dam – the Bakun 
Hydroelectric Dam. Fam goes beyond analysing the roles of various 
stakeholders, such as governments (Chinese, Malaysian, and Austral-
ian), builders, NGOs, companies, and local indigenous communities 
and their interests in this project, also looking at regional, national, 
and international politics that further complicate the situation. By 
examining the divergence of practices between a developed country 
(Australia) versus a rising power (China), this article examines the 
broader geopolitical dynamics in a localised hydropower project. 
An important finding from Fam’s research is that the presence 
of a Western actor (Australia, in this case) does ensure a degree of 
investment in the sustainability of long-term safeguards in the dis-
placed communities. CSR has also been seen as an adequate tool to 
mitigate the negative impacts arising from increased Chinese in-
volvement. Again, similar to Hensengerth’s article, Fam alluded to the 
importance of history and culture for Sarawak’s native communities, 
as they are tied intimately to rivers and the lands around them. Thus, 
Fam’s findings reinforce, similar to the previous article, the idea that 
the Chinese-built dams, despite their merits in energy provision, are 
extremely disruptive and destructive to these riparian cultures.  
To conclude, the everyday experience of encountering a rising 
China differs greatly from one case study to another. These are the 
results of local specifics such as geography, culture, socio-political 
structures, actors’ interests, and levels of economic development, 
which contribute to the respective bargaining power of the various 
actors. In addition, varying experiences of development and percep-
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tions of nature, in addition to cultural, social, and political structures 
in the Chinese context, will also directly impact the host context of 
Chinese investment. Examining how the Chinese companies behave 
or act in the home context will help to explain their interest and ac-
tions in overseas locations. 
This topical issue presents the political ecology of rising China as 
a coherent and flexible framework to understand the global impacts 
of a rising China and enrich our understanding of the differentiating 
outcomes of its rise in Asia and Africa. By focusing on the longer-
term and indirect impacts, we also find examples of both positive and 
negative outcomes of a rising China in areas of development, liveli-
hood security, environmental protection, South–South technology 
transfer, identity, culture and agency, and food security. The findings 
in these papers demonstrate differential impacts of a rising China that 
are highly dependent on numerous local factors, ranging from the 
sectors that Chinese companies are investing in; the maturity of civil 
society and community leadership; the political alliances between 
Chinese companies and the local elites; the involvement of interna-
tional institutions and actors in the local projects; the type of Chinese 
companies (private or state-owned); the type of investment partner-
ship with local stakeholders; and the maturity of local institutions and 
regulatory frameworks and discourses, to mention a few.  
At the same time, the framework also allows us to investigate the 
characteristics of a rising China by evaluating the interests of Chinese 
stakeholders. These interests, shaped by cultural, social, and political 
factors, determine their behaviours at home and subsequently their 
investment behaviours in overseas contexts. In addition, by delving 
into the modalities of investment, typologies of Chinese companies, 
historical experiences, and regulatory demands, we are able to add 
further nuance to the analysis of a very complex human–environment 
relationship that is oriented around multifaceted interactions between 
different stakeholders, structures, and institutions and between local, 
national, and international levels, producing very differentiated out-
comes and impacts at these levels. As such, it provides us a way to 
proactively engage with Chinese actors and to co-create future solu-
tions that will minimise negative impacts resulting from a rising China.  
Last but not least, let us not forget the importance of local 
stakeholders and the vital role they play in terms of negotiating, im-
plementing, mitigating, and enforcing both the positive and negative 
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impacts of a rising China. These actors similarly possess a certain 
amount of power to exercise agency and decide to either dance to or 
counter to the beat of the Chinese tune. By observing the moves 
between these two groups of actors, we will be better able to explain 
the global phenomenon of disparate outcomes of a rising China.  
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